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1  Introduction 
Steve Jobs, CEO of Apple Computers, was ranked by BusinessWeek as one of the 
greatest innovators of the last 75 years in a 2004 article—written before Apple’s introduction of 
the path-breaking iPhone and the recent iPad—because “More than anyone else, Apple's co-
founder has brought digital technology to the masses.”1 Jobs is almost as famous for his self-
confidence. According to the same article “He got his first job at 12 after calling Hewlett-
Packard Co. … President Bill Hewlett and landing an internship.” After achieving prodigious 
early success by co-founding Apple Computers, “Jobs’ cocky attitude and the lack of 
management skills contributed to Apple’s problems. He never bothered to develop budgets….” 
(Koontz and Weihrich 2007, p. 331). According to an article in Fortune, “Jobs likes to make his 
own rules, whether the topic is computers, stock options, or even pancreatic cancer. The same 
traits that make him a great CEO drive him to put his company, and his investors, at risk.”2  
Is this combination of visionary innovation and extraordinary overconfidence a 
coincidence? In this paper we examine a different possibility—that for CEOs, one goes hand in 
hand with the other. 
A recent literature in corporate finance examines how the psychological biases or 
characteristics of managers affect firms' decisions (see, e.g., Bertrand and Schoar 2003, Baker, 
Xin, and Wurgler 2009).  Our focus is on overconfidence, which is the tendency of individuals to 
think they are better than they really are on relevant characteristics, such as ability, judgment, or 
                                                 
1 “So far, 49-year-old Jobs has done just that [changed the world] three times. Soon after he formed Apple in 1976 
with high school friend Steve Wozniak, the Apple II became the first PC to hit it big. … A quarter-century later, he 
rocked the music business with Apple's iPod music player and iTunes online store. This created a blueprint for the 
music biz in the Net era. And his Pixar Animation Studios was the first to show that computer animation could be 
used to tell imaginative, touching stories.” (“Steve Jobs: He Thinks Different,” BusinessWeek, November 1, 2004). 
2 According to Fortune, “Jobs …oozes smug superiority, … No CEO is more willful, or more brazen, at making his 
own rules, in ways both good and bad. And no CEO is more personally identified with—and controlling of—the 
day-to-day affairs of his business.” (“The trouble with Steve Jobs,” Fortune, March 5, 2008).  
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prospects for successful life outcomes (the last item sometimes called ‘optimism’). Theoretical 
research has analyzed why overconfidence exists (Benabou and Tirole 2002); psychological 
research indicates that people, including experts, tend to be overconfident along a variety of 
dimensions, but that there is substantial and persistent individual variation in the degree of 
confidence.3  
Overconfident individuals will tend to overestimate the expected payoffs from uncertain 
endeavors, either because of the general tendency to expect good outcomes, or because they 
overestimate their own efficacy in bringing about success. Furthermore, people tend to be more 
overconfident about their performance on hard than easy tasks—the ‘difficulty effect’ (Griffin 
and Tversky 1992) or ‘hard-easy effect.’ So we expect overconfident CEOs (relative to other 
CEOs) to be especially enthusiastic about risky, challenging, and talent- and vision-sensitive 
enterprises.  
Innovative projects—which apply new business methods, develop new technologies, or 
seek to provide new products or services—are risky and challenging. So innovation is the kind of 
undertaking for which we would expect managerial overconfidence to be potentially important. 
Two considerations reinforce this conclusion. First is the long time it takes to resolve whether an 
innovative project is successful; overconfidence tends to be more severe in settings with 
ambiguous and deferred feedback (Einhorn 1980). Second, the adoption of innovative projects 
may be perceived as indicative of managerial vision or ability. So, innovative projects are likely 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Oskamp (1965), Wagenaar and Keren (1986), Brenner et al. (1996), and Weinstein (1980). Puri and 
Robinson (2007) find that optimism is related to work/life choices, including financial risk-taking. Many 
experimental studies find substantial differences in the degree of overconfidence across individuals (see, e.g., Biais 
et al. 2005); such differences are strong and stable (Klayman and Burt 1998, Klayman et al. 1999). Overconfidence 
also varies with gender (Barber and Odean 2001, Biais et al. 2005), culture (Lee et al. 1995, Koellinger, Minniti and 
Schade 2007), and whether the individual is an expert in the decision domain (Wagenaar and Keren 1986).  
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to be consonant with the self-image of a manager who is strongly ego-driven or self-
aggrandizing.4  
 We therefore hypothesize that firms with overconfident managers accept greater risk, 
invest more heavily in innovative projects, and achieve greater innovation, because they 
overestimate the gain to the firm from innovative projects. It is not crucial for our purposes 
whether CEOs are, on average, overconfident.5 What our tests rely upon are substantial 
differences in the degree of confidence across managers. In addition to the general psychological 
evidence discussed in footnote 1, several corporate finance studies to be discussed find that this 
is indeed the case.   
Whether overconfident CEOs will be better innovators after controlling for the level of 
spending on research and development (R&D) is less clear. On the one hand, overconfident 
managers who pursue innovation aggressively may undertake projects with low expected payoff. 
On the other hand, rational managers may, from the viewpoint of shareholders, excessively 
prefer the ‘D’ in R&D—fairly reliable projects rather than risky but more promising innovative 
ones.6 Overconfident managers can potentially achieve higher average innovative productivity 
by accepting good but risky projects. So we do not hypothesize the direction of the effect of 
                                                 
4 Furthermore, for reputational reasons managers have an incentive to avoid reporting low levels of earnings 
(Mergenthaler, Rajgopal, and Srinivasan 2009). Since research and development (R&D) expenditures, as expenses, 
reduce reported earnings, in the short run they increase the risk of a very low earnings outcome. Overconfident 
managers who expect good outcomes will underweight the possibility that increasing R&D will result in severe 
earnings shortfalls. 
5 Some studies fail to find evidence of overconfidence in certain contexts (see, e.g., Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and 
Kleinbolting 1991, versus Griffin and Tversky 1992). Although there are exceptions, the preponderance of evidence 
supports a general tendency toward overconfidence in various manifestations. For example, according to DeBondt 
and Thaler (1995), overconfidence is “perhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment.” Similarly, 
Rabin (1998) states that “… there is a mass of psychological research that finds people are prone toward 
overconfidence in their judgments. The vast majority of researchers argue that such overconfidence is pervasive, and 
most of the research concerns possible explanations…”  
6 In the model of Goel and Thakor (2008), rational risk-averse CEOs underinvest in risky projects. Overconfident 
CEOs do not avoid these risky projects, so if overconfidence is not too severe it increases firm value. In the model of 
Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2009), overconfidence encourages a risk-averse manager to take riskier projects, which 
reduces the cost of providing compensation incentives to do so. 
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overconfidence on the effectiveness of the CEO in generating innovation for given R&D 
expenditure. 
The biggest puzzle raised by existing research on managerial beliefs and corporate policy 
is that firms often employ overconfident managers, and give them leeway to follow their beliefs 
in making major investment and financing decisions. Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b, 2008) 
find this using options-based and media-based overconfidence measures; Ben-David, Graham, 
and Harvey (2007) show this for CFOs using an overconfidence measure based on stock market 
forecasts. This finding is counterintuitive, since we would normally view rationality as a 
desirable quality for a decisionmaker.  
Furthermore, Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2009) provide evidence of a matching of growth 
firms with taller managers, and reference studies suggesting that height is a proxy for 
overconfidence. Such a matching puts the most confident managers into exactly those firms 
where overconfidence can radically influence strategy, investment choices, and firm survival. By 
measuring ex post success, we suggest a possible solution to this overconfident manager puzzle: 
that overconfident managers are better innovators.  
To test our hypotheses, we use alternative proxies for managerial overconfidence based 
upon options exercise behavior or press coverage. The options exercise measure (Malmendier 
and Tate 2005a) is based on the idea that a manager who chooses to be exposed to the firm’s 
idiosyncratic risk is likely to be confident about the firm’s prospects. Under this approach, a 
CEO who voluntarily retains stock options after the vesting period in which exercise becomes 
permissible is viewed as overconfident.7  
                                                 
7 Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2008) develop measures of CEO overconfidence based on their options exercising 
behavior and insider net stock purchases. Billet and Qian (2008), Liu and Taffler (2008), and Campbell et al. (2009) 
also adopt this measurement approach. Overconfident CEOs may underestimate the variance of project payoffs 
rather than just overestimating the mean. As discussed by Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2010), underestimation of 
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 Our second measure of overconfidence is based upon the portrayal of the CEO in the 
news media, as developed by Malmendier and Tate (2005b, 2008). This is based on counts of 
words relating to overconfidence or its opposite in proximity to the company name and the 
keyword ‘CEO.’8   
We measure the firm’s innovation-related investment by the level of R&D expenditure. 
At the end of a firm’s R&D activities, firms may apply to the US Patents and Trademarks Office 
for a patent. Therefore, our first measure of innovative output and R&D success is the number of 
patents applied for during the year.  
Since patents differ greatly in their importance, following Trajtenberg (1990), we use as 
our second measure of innovative output total citation count. This measure counts the total 
forward citations received by all the patents applied for during the year, where citations are made 
by subsequent patents. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) show that patent citations are 
positively correlated with firm value. We measure the patent count at the time of patent 
application; citations are specific to a patent rather than to a firm. Therefore, these innovation 
measures are not subject to survivorship bias.  
We find that over the 1993-2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have higher 
stock return volatility, consistent with their undertaking riskier projects. Overconfident CEOs 
invest more heavily in R&D, and achieve a greater total quantity of innovation as measured by 
                                                                                                                                                             
payoff volatility implies an underestimation of optionality, which tends to favor advancing rather than delaying 
exercise. However, it also reduces the perceived benefits of diversification, so overall the effect of underestimation 
of variance on the timing of CEO option exercise is theoretically ambiguous. However, as discussed in Section 5.2.1, 
evidence on relation between realized volatility and exercise decisions (e.g., Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace 2009) 
suggests that underestimation of variance should contribute to later option exercise, so that this form of 
overconfidence is also captured by the options-based overconfidence measure.  
8Hribar and Yang (2010) also use this press-based measure of CEO overconfidence. Other approaches have also 
been applied to measure executive overconfidence. Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007) and Graham, Harvey, 
and Puri (2009) use surveys and psychometric tests administered to the executives themselves. Schrand and 
Zechman (2010) develop an overconfidence score that is a function of the CEO’s prevalence in photographs in the 
annual report and the CEO’s cash and non-cash pay relative to that of the second highest paid executive. 
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patent count and citation count. Greater innovative output is not just a result of greater resource 
input; overconfident CEOs achieve greater innovative success even after controlling for the level 
of R&D expenditure. Patenting may be less relevant for certain industries, either because they 
are less innovative, or because in these industries innovation does not result in patents. We find 
that overconfident managers only achieve greater total patents and citations than non-
overconfident managers in industries where patents are important (defined as those with above 
median patent citation counts). We also find no sign that overconfidence is associated with 
inferior performance as measured by sales, return on assets (ROA), or Tobin’s Q. 
Recent work has identified other important effects of managerial overconfidence. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005a) find that overconfident managers are more prone to financing 
projects internally (as predicted by the hypothesis that they think that their company’s stocks are 
undervalued), and to investing more when internal cash is plentiful. Malmendier and Tate (2008) 
find that CEO overconfidence is associated with making acquisitions, and with more negative 
market reactions to acquisition announcement. Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007) 
document that firms with overconfident CFOs engage in more aggressive financing and other 
managerial policies. Hribar and Yang (2010) find that overconfident managers are more likely to 
issue optimistically biased forecasts. Schrand and Zechman (2010) find that overconfidence is 
associated with a greater likelihood of earnings management and financial fraud. Graham, 
Harvey, and Puri (2009) document the relation of managerial traits, including confidence, to a 
variety of corporate policies. Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2010) find that overconfident 
managers are less likely to use external finance, and issue less equity. Most of these findings add 
to the puzzle of why firms are willing to hire overconfident managers.9 
                                                 
9 After developing this paper, we became aware of a recent paper that examines the relation between managerial 
overconfidence and innovation (Galasso and Simcoe 2010). Our papers differ in several ways. We examine how 
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2  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
2.1  The Data 
We use several databases to construct our sample. The Standard and Poor’s Execucomp 
database provides information on the CEOs and their compensation, and we use the data on 
option compensation to construct one of our two measures of CEO overconfidence. The second 
overconfidence measure relies on keyword searches of the text of press articles in Factiva. All 
accounting data are from Compustat and stock returns are from CRSP. Patent-related data are 
from the 2006 edition of the NBER patent database.  
The sample consists of firms in the intersection of Execucomp, Compustat, CRSP, and 
the patent database. All Execucomp firms that operate in the same 4-digit SIC industries as the 
firms in the patent database are included; the sample is therefore not limited to firms with patents. 
Firm-years with missing data on control variables and dependent variables are deleted. We 
further require that there be information on at least one of the CEO overconfidence measure. 
Since our overconfidence measures are lagged by one year, we require that the CEO be the same 
one in the prior year to ensure that we are measuring the characteristics of the CEO who is in 
place at the time that innovation is being measured. Financial firms and utilities are also 
excluded from the study. The final sample consists of 2,880 CEOs from 11,652 firm-year 
observations between 1993 and 2003. 10,297 firm-years have information on the options-based 
                                                                                                                                                             
overconfidence affects risk-taking as well as innovation, and we show that the effects of managerial overconfidence 
come solely from innovative industries. We also examine the effects of overconfidence on firm performance. To 
ensure the robustness of our conclusions, we use the press-based measure of overconfidence as well as the options-
based measure. Finally, our time period and sample size differ substantially. Our time period, 1993-2003, 
encompasses the millennial high-tech boom, and overlaps little with their 1980-94 sample. Our sample is also much 
larger, as it is drawn from the top 1500 firms covered by Execucomp. It consists of 1,913 firms and 11,652 firm-year 
observations whereas their sample covers 290 firms and 3,648 firm-years.  
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measure of overconfidence while 9,246 firm-years have information on the press-based measure 
of overconfidence.  
To test our hypothesis that overconfident CEOs undertake riskier projects, as dependent 
variable we use the standard deviation of daily stock returns during the fiscal year. We measure 
innovation using R&D expenditures and patenting activities which we describe in detail in the 
next subsection. The measurement of CEO overconfidence and the associated control variables 
are also discussed below. A detailed summary of variable definitions is provided in Appendix A.   
 
2.1.1  Measuring Innovation 
 
 We measure resource input into innovation by R&D scaled by book assets. Firms with 
missing R&D information are assigned a zero R&D value and kept in the sample.10 Our output-
oriented measures of innovation are based upon patent counts and patent citations. 
 Data for patent counts and patent citations are constructed using the 2006 edition of the 
NBER patent database (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2001). The database covers over 3.2 million 
patent grants and 23.6 million patent citations from 1976 to 2006 and contains information about 
patent assignee names and their Compustat-matched identifiers, the number of citations received 
by each patent, the technology class of the patent, and similar details. Our second measure of 
innovation is the number of patent applications by a firm during the year.  
Patents are included in the database only if they are eventually granted. Furthermore, 
there is on average a two-year lag between patent application and patent grant. Since the latest 
year in the database is 2006, patents applied for in 2004 and 2005 may not appear in the database. 
As suggested by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001), we restrict our sample period to end in 2003 
                                                 
10 The non-reporting of R&D as a separate line item indicates that the amount of R&D does not cross the threshold 
for materiality under GAAP. Our results are robust to deleting firms with missing R&D instead.  
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and include year fixed effects in our regressions to take into account potential truncation issues 
discussed below.  
Simple patent counts capture innovation success imperfectly (see e.g., Griliches, Pakes, 
and Hall 1987) since patent innovations vary widely in their technological and economic 
significance. One measure of the importance of a patent is its citation count. Patents continue to 
receive citations from other patents for many years subsequent to the innovation. Trajtenberg 
(1990) concludes that citations are related to the social value created by the innovation; Hall, 
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) show that forward citations are related to firm value as measured 
by Tobin’s Q. Therefore, our third measure of innovative activity is based on citation count. This 
is the total number of citations ultimately received by the patents applied for during the given 
year; as such it takes into account both the number of patents and the number of forward 
citations per patent.11  
Survivorship bias is minimal to non-existent in the patent database. An ultimately 
successful patent application is counted and attributed to the applying firm at the time of 
application even if the firm is later acquired or goes bankrupt.12 Furthermore, citations are 
specific to a patent and not a firm. Therefore, a patent that belongs to a bankrupt firm can 
continue to receive citations in the database for many years after the firm goes out of existence. 
However, owing to the finite length of the sample, citations suffer from a truncation bias. 
Since citations are received for many years after a patent is created, patents created in later years 
have less time to accumulate citations than patents created in earlier years. To address this, we 
                                                 
11 Citation count includes self-citations. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) find that self-citations are more valuable 
than external citations. They suggest that this is because self-citations (which require generating further related 
patents) are indicative of the firm’s competitive advantage in the relevant technology.  
12 One issue that remains is when a firm goes bankrupt prior to the granting of the patent. It is unclear whether the 
patent would be assigned to the bankrupt firm in the database. However, the average time between patent application 
and grant date is only about 2 years, so a firm would need to apply for a patent and go bankrupt almost immediately 
for this circumstance to arise.  
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adjust the patent citation count of each patent using the weighting index from Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg (2001, 2005), also found in the NBER patent database. The weighting index is 
created using a quasi-structural approach where the shape of the citation-lag distribution is 
econometrically estimated. Citation count is the sum of the adjusted patent citations across all 
patents applied during each firm-year.  
 
2.1.2  Options-based Measure of CEO Overconfidence 
 To identify overconfidence, Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2008) exploit the overexposure 
of CEOs to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms through their holdings of stock options. 
Following Malmendier and Tate, we define a CEO as overconfident once she postpones the 
exercise of vested options that are at least 67% in the money.13 The Confident CEO (Options) 
variable takes on the value one when she is identified as overconfident, and is zero otherwise. 
Once a CEO is identified as overconfident under the options-based measure, she remains so for 
the rest of the sample period. This treatment is consistent with the notion that overconfidence is a 
persistent trait. In our regression tests, the CEO overconfidence measures are lagged by one 
period with respect to the dependent variable.   
 As we do not have detailed data on the CEO’s options holdings and exercise prices for 
each option grant, we follow Campbell et al. (2009) in calculating an average moneyness of the 
CEO’s option portfolio for each year. First, for each CEO-year, we calculate the average 
realizable value per option by dividing the total realizable value of the options by the number of 
options held by the CEO. The strike price is calculated as the fiscal year end stock price minus 
                                                 
13 Malmendier and Tate (2005a) further require that the CEO exhibit the late exercise behavior twice, which leads to 
the use of forward-looking information. Malmendier and Tate (2008) refine their measure and require that the CEO 
exhibits late exercise behavior only once. In our robustness checks, we require that the CEO holds a 67% in the 
money option at least twice and define the CEO as overconfident after the first time she exhibits such a behavior. 
Results are generally similar using this alternative measure.  
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the average realizable value. The average moneyness of the options is then calculated as the 
stock price divided by the estimated strike price minus 1. As we are only interested in options 
that the CEO can exercise, we include only the vested options held by the CEO.  
 
2.1.3  Press-based Measure of CEO Overconfidence 
 Following Malmendier and Tate (2005b, 2008), we also use a press-based measure of 
CEO overconfidence. We search Factiva for articles referring to the CEO in the New York Times, 
BusinessWeek, Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal, The Economist, Fortune, and Forbes. 
Specifically, we retrieve all articles using the available unique company code in Factiva and the 
search keyword ‘CEO.’ For each CEO and year, we record (1) the total number of articles, (2) 
the number of articles containing the words ‘confident,’ ‘confidence,’ or variants such as 
overconfidence and  over-confident, (3) the number of articles containing the words ‘optimistic,’ 
‘optimism,’ or variants such as overoptimistic, over-optimism, (4) the number of articles using 
‘pessimistic,’ ‘pessimism’ or variants such as over-pessimistic, and (5) the number of articles 
using ‘reliable,’ ‘steady,’ ‘practical,’ ‘conservative,’ ‘frugal,’ ‘cautious,’ or ‘gloomy.’ Category 5 
also contains articles in which ‘confident’ and ‘optimistic’ are negated.  
 For each year, we compare the number of articles that use the ‘Confident’ terms, i.e., 
categories 2 and 3, and articles that use the ‘Cautious’ terms, i.e., categories 4 and 5. We 
measure of CEO overconfidence for each CEO i in year t as  
 
Confident CEO (Press)it   =       
                    0 otherwise, 
1 if ∑ ∑
= =
>
t
s
t
s
isis ba
1 1
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where ais is the number of articles using the ‘Confident’ terms and bis is the number of articles 
using the ‘Cautious’ terms. We cumulate articles starting from the first year the CEO is in office 
(for CEOs who assumed office after 1992) or 1992 when we begin our article search and is also 
the first year of Execucomp data.   
 Following Malmendier and Tate (2008), we also control for the total number of press 
mentions over the same period (TotalMention). The press may be biased toward positive stories 
and this would imply a higher number of mentions as ‘confident’ or ‘optimistic’ when there is 
more attention in the press. In our regression tests, the CEO overconfidence measures are lagged 
by one period with respect to the dependent variable. Thus, only past articles are used to predict 
innovation. In one of our robustness checks, we define our press-based confidence measure using 
only news articles in the past one year; the results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar.      
 
2.1.4  Other explanatory variables 
 When explaining patenting activities, we follow Hall and Ziedonis (2001) in including 
controls for firm size and capital intensity. We measure firm size using the natural logarithm of 
sales, measured in 2006 millions of dollars. Similar results are obtained if we use book assets or 
number of employees as alternative size controls. Capital intensity is proxied by the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of net Property, Plant, and Equipment in 2006 dollars to the number of 
employees. When explaining stock return volatility and R&D expenditures, we further include as 
control variables sales growth, profitability measured by return on assets (ROA), book leverage, 
and cash holdings. All the regressions include year and industry fixed effects, where the industry 
is defined at the 2-digit SIC level.  
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We also include controls that take into account CEO tenure and compensation. We 
include CEO stock ownership and option ownership, defined as the number of options held by 
the CEO divided by the shares outstanding. We alternatively use measures of CEO incentives 
motivated by option pricing theory, CEO delta and CEO option holdings vega. Delta is defined 
as the dollar change in a CEO’s stock and option portfolio for a 1% change in stock price, and 
measures the CEO’s incentives to increase stock price. Vega is the dollar change in a CEO’s 
option holdings for a 1% change in stock return volatility; it measures the risk-taking incentives 
generated by the CEO’s option holdings. We calculate delta and vega values using the one-year 
approximation method of Core and Guay (2002). All control variables are lagged by one period 
and winsorized at the 1% level in both tails.  
 
2.2  Descriptive Statistics  
 Table 1 describes the frequency of overconfident CEOs in our sample.14 The two 
measures generate very different average frequencies of overconfident CEOs: 61.35% with the 
options-based measure, and 7.70% with the press-based measure. However, a CEO-year is more 
likely to be classified as overconfident by the press-based measure when the CEO-year is 
overconfident using the options-based measure; out of the CEO-years with non-missing data on 
both measures, 5.37% of the CEO-years are classified as overconfident by both measures, while 
only 2.86% are classified as overconfident by the press-based measure when the options-based 
measure indicates otherwise. The relatively small number of overconfident CEOs by the press-
based measure suggests that the press-based measure may be considerably more stringent. If so, 
those it identifies as overconfident may be more likely to actually be overconfident, but the non-
                                                 
14 Steve Jobs of Apple Computers turns out to be overconfident in our sample using both measures of 
overconfidence. 
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overconfident category may contain a relatively high number of misidentified overconfident 
CEOs. 
 A manager who is identified as overconfident in any year using the options-based 
measure remains so throughout the sample period. This mechanically tends to induce an increase 
in the fraction of overconfident managers through the sample period. This is evident in the earlier 
part of the sample period. However, owing to increased CEO turnover activity (see e.g., Kaplan 
and Minton 2008), during the second half of the sample period there is a slight decreasing trend 
in the fraction of overconfident CEOs. Nevertheless, using the options-based measure, the 
overall fraction of overconfident managers, 61.35%, is only somewhat higher than the fraction in 
the last year of the sample, 58.77%.  
Under the press-based measure, a CEO can sometimes change from being confident to 
non-confident. This happens when there is an increase in the number of articles in the year that 
use the ‘Cautious’ terms relative to articles that use the ‘Confident’ terms, so that the cumulative 
number of ‘Cautious’ articles increases. However, overconfidence as measured by the press-
based measure is highly persistent. In our sample, given that in period t, the CEO is classified as 
overconfident, she will still be overconfident 92.71% of the time in period t + 1, 86.96% of the 
time in period t + 2, and 82.90% of the time in period t+3.  
Since we start cumulating articles only in 1992 or later, and classify CEOs with zero 
news mention as non-overconfident, the number of confident CEOs in the earlier years could be 
biased downwards. Therefore, in untabulated robustness checks, we perform tests involving the 
press-based measure only on firm-years from 2000 onward. The results and conclusions drawn 
are similar.  
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Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. Panel A 
classifies the sample according to the options-based confidence measure. Consistent with our 
hypotheses, more confident managers have significantly higher mean and median stock return 
volatility, R&D/Assets, and citation count.15 Also consistent with our hypotheses, they have 
greater mean number of patents applied for and raw citation count, which does not take into 
account the truncation bias. An overconfident CEO has on average about 10 more patents than a 
non-overconfident CEO and has about 1.5 times as many citations.  
Panel B provides statistics for the press-based measure. As with Panel A, overconfident 
managers have higher innovation measures; indeed the effects are consistently significant for 
medians as well as means. Furthermore, compared to Panel A, the effects of overconfident CEO 
on patenting activities is even larger, consistent with the press-based measure being a more 
stringent proxy for overconfidence. For example, an overconfident CEO has on average 77.75 
patents, while a non-overconfident CEO has only 18.93. Furthermore, an overconfident CEO has 
about three times as many citations as the non-confident CEO. However, the effect of 
overconfident CEO becomes insignificant for return volatility. 
With respect to the control variables, in Panel A for options-based overconfidence, 
overconfident CEOs manage firms with smaller firm size as measured by sales, greater sales 
growth, greater ROA, lower book leverage, lower capital intensity (PPE/emp), and greater cash. 
The association with greater sales growth is consistent with the finding of Graham, Harvey, and 
Puri (2009) that tall CEOs tend to be associated with growth firms if, as suggested by several 
authors, height is a proxy for overconfidence. The association with lower leverage differs from 
the evidence of Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2007) that overconfident CFOs (as identified 
                                                 
15 The citation count variable is significantly higher for overconfident managers in the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test 
even though the medians in both categories are zero. This can occur because strictly speaking the test is a rank sum 
test rather than a test of medians (see, e.g., http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/mann-whitney.htm).   
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using their stock market forecasts) use more debt. However, the univariate relation in Panel A is 
not necessarily causal; there are also differences in sample owing to data restrictions.  
Overconfident CEOs also tend to have longer tenure, higher share ownership, higher 
option holdings, and higher delta and vega values. The last four items make sense, as an 
overconfident manager who expects to perform well and to take risky projects should be more 
willing to accept compensation that is more positive sensitive to performance and risk. These 
findings are also consistent with the evidence of Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2007) that 
firms with overconfident CFOs tilt their executive compensation more toward performance-
based bonuses. 
For Panel B using the press-based measure, some of these relations are different, 
probably because the press-based measure of overconfidence is much more strongly tilted toward 
large firms. For example, in contrast with Panel A, in Panel B the sales of firms with 
overconfident CEOs are on the order of 3-4 times greater than the sales of non-overconfident 
firms. Given this, it is not surprising that in contrast with Panel A, in Panel B the sales growth 
rate of overconfident firms is significantly smaller than the growth rate of non-overconfident 
firms. We do not view this as indicating that low-growth firms try to hire overconfident 
managers; this is probably just a consequence of the fact that small firms tend to grow more 
rapidly than large firms. Also in contrast with Panel A but consistent with the CFO evidence of 
Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2007), in Panel B firms with overconfident CFOs have higher 
leverage. Panel B also shows that firms with overconfident managers have greater capital 
intensity, again possibly driven by their greater size. 
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3  Overconfidence and Risk-Taking 
We hypothesize that overconfident managers are more willing to undertake risky projects 
because they expect to succeed in such undertakings. Therefore, we examine the relation 
between CEO overconfidence and overall firm volatility.  
In the tests, for each of the options- and press-based overconfidence measures, we use 
three specifications. Our base specification includes only firm characteristics. In the second 
specification, we include manager-related controls in some specifications. Our manager-related 
controls are the natural logarithm of one plus CEO tenure, Log(1+tenure), CEO share ownership, 
and CEO option holdings. Finally, in the third specification, we replace share ownership and 
option holdings with the natural logarithm of one plus CEO delta, Log(1+delta), and the natural 
logarithm of one plus CEO vega, Log(1+vega), which measures the CEO’s incentive to increase 
stock price and firm risk respectively. The regression tests include year and industry fixed effects, 
defined based on 2-digit SIC codes. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Table 3 provides evidence that CEO overconfidence is associated with greater subsequent 
realized stock return volatility. We measure stock return volatility as the standard deviation of 
daily stock returns, expressed in percentage terms. Models (1)-(3) use the options-based measure 
of overconfidence, and models (4)-(6) use the press-based measure. Following Malmendier and 
Tate (2008), in all the press-based tests, we additionally control for TotalMention, which 
measures the frequency with which the manager is referred to in the press.  
In all the tests, CEO overconfidence is associated with higher subsequent realized stock 
return volatility. The coefficient in the base model (1) shows that having an overconfident CEO 
increases daily return volatility by 0.104% (p < 0.01). Multiplying this by the square root of 
about 252 trading days in a year implies that overconfidence increases volatility by about 1.65% 
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per year. Taking the ratio of 0.104 to the median level of volatility of non-overconfident 
managers of 2.294 from Table 1 shows that overconfidence increases volatility by about 4.53% 
above its base level. The coefficients and statistical significance in models (2) and (3) are similar.  
As a benchmark for comparison, the coefficient on Log(sales) in model (1) is –0.232, 
which indicates that a doubling of firm size, as measured by sales, increases volatility by Log(2) 
* (–0.232) = –0.161% per day, or –0.161% * sqrt(252) =  –2.55% per year. So the absolute value 
of the effect of overconfidence on volatility is smaller than, but of the same order of magnitude 
as, the effect of doubling firm size.  
Using the press-based measure of overconfidence, the effect on volatility is larger. In 
Models (4)-(6), the coefficients on Confident CEO (Press) range from 0.201 to 0.228, all 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient in the base model (4) shows that having an 
overconfident CEO increases daily return volatility by 0.201%. Multiplying this by the square 
root of about 252 trading days in a year implies that overconfidence increases volatility by about 
3.19% per year. Taking the ratio of 0.201 to the median level of volatility of non-overconfident 
managers of 2.698 from Table 1 shows that overconfidence increases volatility from its base 
level by about 7.45%. 
Consistent with prior literature, Table 1 shows that small, high growth, and high leverage 
firms tend to have higher stock return volatility. Poorly performing firms and firms with high 
cash levels also tend to have higher risk (Opler et al. 1999). Perhaps surprisingly, firms in which 
CEOs have higher vega values have lower stock return volatility.16     
 
 
                                                 
16 This could be due to the endogeneity of vega, see e.g., see Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) and Low (2009).   
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4  Overconfidence and Innovative Activity  
We have hypothesized that overconfidence increases innovative investment, as measured 
by R&D expenditures, and innovative output, as measured by patents and patent citations. 
 
4.1  R&D Expenditures 
To test whether overconfidence causes CEOs to increase spending on innovation as 
measured by R&D expenditures, we use as R&D scaled by assets as dependent variable in the 
regressions of Table 4. The first two rows show that using either the options- or press-based 
overconfidence measures, overconfident CEOs spend more on R&D.  
The models in columns (1)–(3) using the options-based measure of overconfidence all 
show a positive and significant effect of overconfidence on R&D at a significance level of 1% to 
5%. The coefficient in model (1) shows that having an overconfident CEO increases 
R&D/Assets by 0.006. Taking the ratio of this to the mean level of R&D/Assets of non-
overconfident CEOs of 0.028 from Table 1 (the median is zero) shows that overconfidence 
increases the amount of R&D by 21.35%, a substantial effect. 
In model (2), which includes additional controls that capture managerial characteristics 
that could affect the incentives to engage in spending on innovation, the coefficient on Confident 
CEO (Options) declines only slightly from the base model, and remains significant at the 5% 
level. In model (3) the coefficient on Confident CEO (Options) becomes a bit higher (0.008), and 
is significant at the 1% level.  
Models (4)-(6) use the press-based measure of overconfidence. The qualitative 
conclusions are identical to those using the options-based measure, with the economic 
significance somewhat larger. In model (4), which uses the basic set of firm controls, the 
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coefficient on overconfidence is 0.009 (p < 0.05). The inclusion of managerial controls in model 
(5) increases the coefficient on overconfidence to 0.012 (p < 0.01), and the results are similar 
when share and option holdings are replaced with Log(1+delta) and Log(1+vega) with the 
coefficient on overconfidence being 0.011 (p < 0.01). 
The coefficient in model (4) shows that having an overconfident CEO, as defined using 
the press-based measure, increases R&D/Assets by 0.009. Taking the ratio of this to the mean 
level of R&D/Assets of 0.037 from Panel B of Table 1 (the median level is 0.001) shows that 
overconfidence increases the amount of R&D/Assets by 24.32%, which is again a substantial 
effect.  
 We find that higher R&D expenditures are associated with smaller firms and firms with 
poor profitability, low leverage, higher capital intensity, and higher cash holdings. Furthermore, 
as in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), we find that lower delta values and higher vega values 
are associated with increased spending on R&D. 
  
4.2   Overconfidence and Patenting Activity 
We now examine the effect of overconfidence on the fruits of innovative activity as 
proxied by the number of patents the firm applies for in a given year (and eventually receives). 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus patent count. The control variables in 
the base model are based on the tests of Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and Aghion, Van Reenen, and 
Zingales (2009). Table 5 indicates that overconfident CEOs have higher patent counts.  
The base model (1) shows that with the options-based measure, overconfident managers 
are associated with significantly higher patent count (p < 0.05). The coefficient in model (1) 
shows that having an overconfident CEO increases Log(1 + patent) by 0.111. From Table 1 
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Panel A, the mean number of patents for non-overconfident managers is 21.886, implying Log(1 
+ Patent) of 3.13. So overconfidence increases this variable by 0.111, to 3.24. This implies an 
increase in the number of patents to exp(3.24) – 1 = 24.53. This represents an increase in the 
number of patents by (24.53/21.89) – 1 = 12.06%. 
In model (2), the addition of the managerial controls leaves the coefficient unchanged, 
and the effect remains significant at the 5% level. In model (3), the replacement of the stock and 
option holding variables with the delta and vega variables causes a modest drop in the size of the 
coefficient (from 0.111 to 0.086), and the effect becomes marginally insignificant (p = 10.1%). It 
is not surprising that there would be some loss of significance in model (3), since Log(1+delta) 
has a fairly high correlation, 0.32, with Confident CEO (Options). Furthermore, the vega control 
may capture part of the effect of overconfidence that we seek to measure, because an 
overconfident manager who is prone to risky projects may be more willing to accept 
compensation schemes that reward risk-taking.   
Strongly reinforcing evidence about the effect of overconfidence on patents is provided 
by the tests that use the press-based overconfidence measure. The coefficients on overconfidence 
are significant at the 1% to 5% levels, and the coefficients are even more substantial 
economically (ranging from 0.271 to 0.291). Relative to the mean number of patents for non-
confident managers (18.926), model 4 implies 33.32% more patents for firms led by 
overconfident CEOs. The larger economic significance with the press-based measure is also 
consistent with the press-based measure being a more stringent measure of overconfidence.  
Together, the evidence from the options- and press-based measures indicates that overconfidence 
is associated with a substantially greater number of patent applications. 
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4.3  Patent Citations 
Patents differ greatly in their importance. One measure of their importance is the number 
of citations that they receive from subsequent patents. To assess whether overconfidence 
increases the total extent of successful innovative activity, we test for the relation of 
overconfidence to the number of citations the firm’s patents receive. We do not control here for 
firm-level R&D, so the effect of overconfidence on citations could come from either greater 
investment in innovation or from higher productivity. We later examine specifically the effect of 
overconfidence on the firm’s innovation controlling for R&D.  
Table 6 indicates that firms with overconfident CEOs obtain a greater number of patent 
citations. The dependent variable is Log(1 + citation count). As discussed in Section 2, to address 
truncation bias we adjust the raw citation count number for each patent using the weighting 
index of Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005) before aggregating across all patents for the 
firm-year. 
The base model (1) uses the same controls as in the tests for patent counts to capture firm 
scale and capital intensity. Model (1) shows that using the options-based measure, 
overconfidence increases Log(1 + citation count) by 0.201 (p < 0.01). Using calculations similar 
to those performed with the patent count and comparing with the mean citation count (290.681) 
for the non-confident CEOs in Table 1 Panel A, this represents an increase in the citation count 
by 22.38%, an economically substantial effect. 
In model (2), the addition of the managerial controls decreases the coefficient slightly to 
0.188, significant at the 5% level. In model (3), the replacement of the stock and option holding 
variables with the delta and vega variables causes a moderate drop in the size of the coefficient 
to 0.156, but the effect remains significant at the 10% level. 
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The tests that use the press-based overconfidence measure confirm that overconfidence 
results in greater citation count. The coefficients on overconfidence are significant at the 1% to 
5% levels, and the coefficients are even more substantial, ranging from 0.388 to 0.436, which 
translates to even greater economic significance. For example, from Table 1 Panel B, the mean 
citation count for non-overconfident managers is 319.422, and the coefficient on confident CEO 
in the base model (4) is 0.388, so overconfidence is associated with a 47.55% increase in the 
citation count.  
As in Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2009), we find that larger and more capital 
intensive firms have more patent citations. Overall, the evidence from the options- and press-
based overconfidence measures indicates that overconfidence is associated with a substantially 
greater number of patent citations. 
 
4.4  Industry Innovativeness    
We expect the effect of overconfidence on innovative outcomes to be much larger in 
industries in which good opportunities for innovation are available. We therefore split the sample 
to perform separate tests of the effect of overconfidence in more- versus less- innovative 
industries. In addition to providing a test of whether industry is important, we expect the test that 
is limited to innovative industries to be a more powerful way to identify the effects of 
overconfidence on innovation. We focus on citation count as the dependent variable, but the 
results using patent count are similar. 
 We define an industry as innovative if the average citations (adjusted for truncation bias) 
per patent for the industry during the preceding year is greater than the median average citation 
across all industries. The percentage of overconfident CEOs in the innovative industry is 
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somewhat higher than the percentage in the non-innovative industries for both overconfidence 
measures. Using the options-based measure, the percentage of overconfident CEOs is 63.61% in 
innovative industries and 56.53% in non-innovative industries. The corresponding figures using 
the press-based measure are 8.10% and 6.88% for innovative and non-innovative industries 
respectively. 
Table 7 shows that overconfidence increases patent citations only in innovative industries. 
Within innovative industries, the effect of overconfidence is stronger and has higher statistical 
significance than the previous tests in Table 6 that pool across all industries. The base model (1) 
shows that using the options-based measure, overconfidence increases citation count with 
significance at the 1% level. The coefficient on overconfidence of 0.279 is larger than the 
corresponding coefficient in Table 6 which pools across all industries, 0.201. This shows that 
having an overconfident CEO has a greater effect on citations within innovative industries.  
In model (2), the addition of the managerial controls leaves the coefficient almost 
unchanged at 0.281, still significant at the 1% level. In model (3), the replacement of the stock 
and option holding variables with the delta and vega variables causes a slight drop in the size of 
the coefficient to 0.260, significant at the 5% level. 
The tests that use press-based overconfidence measure show even more strongly that 
within innovative industries overconfidence results in greater citation count. The coefficients on 
overconfidence are all significant at the 1% level, with coefficients ranging from 0.549 to 0.613.  
Overall, the evidence from the options- and press-based overconfidence measures 
indicates that within innovative industries, overconfidence is associated with a substantially 
greater number of patent citations. In sharp contrast, within non-innovative industries, for all of 
models (1)–(6), the coefficients on overconfidence are close to zero and statistically insignificant. 
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This suggests that overconfidence encourages patent citations only within industries where there 
are substantial opportunities for innovation of this type.  
5  Robustness Checks and Alternative Hypotheses 
 In this section, we examine several further robustness checks, and consider alternative 
hypotheses that can potentially explain our results.  
5.1 Robustness Checks 
Since focusing on innovative industries provide the most powerful tests of the effects of 
overconfidence on innovation, it is useful at this point to discuss several robustness checks for 
the tests that use only firms in innovative industries. The first is to use an alternative method to 
adjust citation count for truncation bias. We divide the citation count for each patent by the 
average citations per patent for all patents applied in the same year. The results (not reported) are 
similar to those in Table 7. 
As mentioned earlier, the control variables we use are similar to those in other studies of 
the determinants of patent citations. If we also include the additional variables used in our tests 
of the determinants of R&D (sales growth, ROA, book leverage, and cash), the results are similar 
to those shown in Table 7. The results in Table 6, which pool across innovative versus non-
innovative industries, are also generally similar but not all the tests using the options-based 
overconfidence measure are statistically significant. As discussed earlier, we view tests within 
innovative industries to be a more powerful way of evaluating the effects of overconfidence. 
The independent variables are lagged by one year in our tests. However overconfidence 
and other variables could have a longer lagged effect on innovation, so we examine the effect of 
 26
adding a two year lag on the overconfidence variable and the controls. The results are similar to 
those in Tables 5-7.   
 We also consider a Negative Binomial model for the prediction of citation count instead 
of an OLS regression specification.17 Since this requires a discrete count variable, for this test we 
did not perform the truncation bias adjustment (which causes adjusted citations to become 
continuous). The results are similar to that in Table 7.  We also test for the effect of 
overconfidence on patent counts with a Negative Binomial model. Again, overconfidence 
increases patent count only among firms in innovative industries.  
Since innovation is important in high-tech industries, and the technology boom of 1998-
2000 was an exceptional period for these industries, we examine the effects of excluding this 
period from our sample in the patent count and citation count tests for the overall sample and for 
firms in innovative industries. The results are generally similar. 
As shown in Table 1 Panel B, the average number of articles mentioning the CEO is 
much smaller for the sample of non-confident CEOs. This is due to the fact that we classify 
CEOs with zero press coverage as non-overconfident. 5,978 firm-years have zero press coverage. 
For the press-based confidence measure, when we restrict the sample to the subsample of CEOs 
for which we have at least one news article, results are similar.  
 
5.2   Alternative Hypotheses  
We consider here several alternative interpretations of our findings associated with 
alternative interpretations of the overconfidence proxies (private information, differences in risk 
                                                 
17 A Negative Binomial model is preferable to the Poisson model because the likelihood ratio test of no over-
dispersion is rejected for all the models.    
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tolerance, and CEO underestimation of risk), and endogenous matching between CEO and firm 
characteristics. 
 
5.2.1  Alternative Interpretations of the Overconfidence Proxies 
Private Information 
A possible concern about the options-based measure of overconfidence is that it may be 
correlated with private information on the part of the manager, since a manager with favorable 
information may be inclined to hold the option rather than exercise and sell the stock.18 Such 
favorable information could then explain strong subsequent performance in patents and citations. 
However, private information should be fairly short-lived, whereas our overconfidence 
measures are persistent. As in Malmendier and Tate (2005), we view overconfidence as a fairly 
persistent personality trait. Malmendier and Tate find that overconfident CEOs are late exercisers 
persistently over time, and do not earn abnormal returns through their decision not to exercise. 
Furthermore, Carpenter and Remmers (2001) report that there is almost no evidence that 
managers exercise based upon inside information under the current regulatory regime (in place 
since May 1991) that allows insiders to sell shares immediately after exercise. So it is unlikely 
that the effects of overconfidence identified here derive from inside information. Also, the press-
based measure of overconfidence is based upon publicly available and widely disseminated 
information and hence is not a proxy for inside information.  
 Furthermore, the private information argument suggests that non-exercising CEOs will 
make better investments. The evidence of Malmendier and Tate (2008) is exactly the opposite; 
                                                 
18 A special case of this argument is that managers refrain from exercising their options in order to signal favorable 
information. Malmendier and Tate (2005a) argue that option non-exercise is an implausible vehicle for signaling 
firm value, and that the financial press and financial advisory firms do not focus on exercise as a value indicator. 
However, what we emphasize here is that signaling motives do not present any special problem for the options-
based measure above and beyond the issue of private information discussed in the main text. 
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acquisitions made by overconfident CEOs, defined using the options-based measure, perform 
less well. 
 
Risk-Tolerance 
A possible alternative explanation for our findings is that managers who refrain from 
option exercise are more risk tolerant rather than more overconfident. This willingness to bear 
risk could then result in greater risk-taking and greater innovation. Furthermore, some of the 
words used to identify overconfidence using the press-based measure may also be indicators of 
risk tolerance. 
Even if this interpretation were true, it would not overturn one of the key insights of this 
paper, that there are managerial traits that are systematically associated with greater innovation. 
Furthermore, as pointed out by Malmendier and Tate (2005a), their evidence that their options-
based overconfidence measure is associated with lower investment-cash flow sensitivity is 
inconsistent with it being a proxy for higher risk-tolerance. Less-risk-averse managers should be 
more willing to leverage up the firm if necessary to finance investment projects. Malmendier and 
Tate (2005b) find similar results with the press-based measure of overconfidence.  
 
Underestimation of Risk 
A possible concern about the options-based measure is that instead of just overestimating 
the expected profitability of undertaking new projects, an overconfident CEO may overestimate 
the precision of their beliefs about the future, and therefore may underestimate risk. This raises a 
possible concern about the options-based measure, since a manager who underestimates risk will 
underestimate the value of the option feature. This seems to suggest that overconfident managers 
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will tend to exercise options early instead of late. In other words, this suggests that the options-
based measure is a proxy for underconfidence rather than overconfidence.  
This would be quite surprising, given evidence from several papers (including the current 
one) that the options-based measure is associated with behaviors predicted by (overestimation-of 
-mean) overconfidence, and yields results very similar to the press-based option measure 
(Malmendier and Tate 2005a, 2005b, 2008, 2010). As Campbell et al. (2009) discuss, it is invalid 
to value a CEO option using no-arbitrage option pricing theory, since CEOs cannot perform the 
required costless riskfree dynamic hedging strategy. When CEO options are instead valued using 
expected utility theory, there is an opposing effect: higher volatility makes the option riskier, 
which encourages exercise in order to sell the stock and diversify. Therefore, underestimation of 
risk can lead to late exercise.   
 Overall, theoretical analysis indicates that the effect of higher variance on option value is 
nonmonotonic (Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace 2010), and empirically high realized variance is 
associated with earlier exercise of executive options (Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon 2005, 
Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace 2009). This suggests that underestimating variance should favor 
later exercise—consistent with the options-based measure being a proxy for overconfidence, 
both in the sense of overestimating the mean and underestimating the variance. 
 
5.2.2  Matching between CEO Overconfidence and Firm Characteristics 
 There are two causally distinct interpretations of the results we have presented so far. 
One is that overconfidence causes managers to overestimate their prospects for success in risky 
endeavors and therefore to undertake more innovative activity. The other is that firms that are 
risky and have strong opportunities for innovative projects appoint overconfident CEOs. Several 
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authors propose that height is an overconfidence proxy; Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2009) 
interpret their evidence that growth firms tend to have tall CEOs as consistent with a matching 
between manager and firm. 
 One reason to believe that our findings are not driven solely by matching is that all our 
tests control for industry fixed effects (using 2-digit SIC codes), and several of the tests control 
for firm characteristics such as sales growth and leverage. To further address matching, we now 
restrict our sample to focus on a subset of firm-years for which matching is likely to be less 
important.  
 CEO overconfidence in our tests is a persistent trait (and with the options-based measure 
is fully persistent by definition). In contrast, a firm’s growth opportunities vary over time as its 
strategic resources and competitive environment shift. So any matching effects between CEO 
overconfidence and firm characteristics should be strongest when the manager is first appointed. 
Therefore, to evaluate whether the effects we identify derive solely from matching, in Table 8 we 
reexamine the effects of overconfidence after eliminating from the sample all firm-years in 
which the manager’s tenure with the firm was 5 years or less. Table 8 only shows the coefficients 
on the confidence measures. The control variables and model specifications are the same as in 
the corresponding earlier tables that use the corresponding dependent variables. 
Panel A shows that for both options- and press-based overconfidence measures, 
overconfidence continues to be positively related to stock return volatility, with significance at 
the 5% in all models. Panel B shows that for both overconfidence measures, overconfidence 
positively and significantly predicts the ratio of R&D to assets (with 5% or 1% significance). 
The coefficients in Panel B are larger than the corresponding coefficients in Table 4, consistent 
with a causal effect of overconfidence rather than a pure matching effect. Similarly, Panel C 
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shows that for both overconfidence measures, overconfidence positively and significantly 
predicts Log(1+ patent) with 5% or 1% significance, and the coefficients are larger than the 
corresponding coefficients in Table 5. Finally, Panel D shows that for both overconfidence 
measures, overconfidence positively and significantly predicts Log(1 + citation count) with 5% 
or 10% significance, and again the coefficients are larger than the corresponding coefficients in 
Table 6. In summary, while we do not rule out matching effects, these tests are consistent with 
causality from CEO overconfidence to greater innovation.  
 
6  Overconfidence and Efficiency in Generating Innovation 
We have found that managerial overconfidence increases patent applications and patent 
citations. But since we have also found that managerial overconfidence increases R&D 
investment, the question remains open of whether managerial overconfidence increases or 
decreases the effectiveness of the manager in generating innovation for any given level of R&D 
expenditure. To test whether managerial overconfidence improves the effectiveness of the firm 
in generating innovation, we regress Log(1+citation count) on the overconfidence measures and 
add lagged R&D scaled by book assets to the set of controls.19    
In Table 9, as in the earlier tables, models (1)-(3) use the options-based measure of 
overconfidence, and models (4)-(6) use the press-based measure. The coefficients on the 
overconfidence variables among the firms in innovative industries are all positive and significant, 
and are smaller than the corresponding coefficients in Table 7, indicating that overconfidence 
increases the effectiveness of innovation for given level of R&D. For the options-based measure 
                                                 
19 The innovation process normally has considerable lags. However, as discussed by Hall and Ziedonis (2001), much 
of the earlier patent literature has concluded that it is hard to identify the lag structure for the production of patents 
from past R&D spending due to high autocorrelation in R&D spending. Therefore, we include R&D spending 
lagged by only one period. In untabulated results, we follow Hall and Ziedonis (2001) and control for the 
contemporaneous R&D spending instead. Results are similar to those shown in Table 9. 
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the coefficients are surprisingly close to those of Table 7, suggesting that the major source of the 
total increase in innovative output from having an overconfident CEO is the increase in 
innovation effectiveness. However, for the press-based measure, the coefficients are substantially 
lower than the corresponding coefficients in Table 7, indicating that both the increase in R&D 
and increased effectiveness contribute to the overall innovative productivity. When we focus on 
the firms in the non-innovative industries, none of the coefficients on the overconfidence 
measures are significant.   
Within innovative industries, the base model (1) shows that using the options-based 
measure, overconfidence increases the citation count (p < 0.01).The coefficient on 
overconfidence of 0.254 is a bit smaller than the corresponding coefficient in Table 7 which does 
not control for R&D, 0.279, suggesting that a major part of the effect of overconfidence on 
citation count operates through its effect on increasing the effectiveness of innovation for given 
R&D.  
The findings using the press-based overconfidence measure are similar. The coefficients 
on press-based overconfidence are all significant at the 5% level, with coefficients ranging from 
0.358 to 0.382 among firms in the innovative industries. Overall, the evidence from both the 
options- and press-based overconfidence measures shows that within innovative industries, 
overconfident CEOs are associated with greater patent citations after controlling for the amount 
of innovative investment.  
This is surprising, since we would typically expect biased perceptions to lead to error and 
inefficiency. A possible explanation is that these projects generate patents and citations but not 
market value. However, evidence from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) indicates that patent 
citations are on average positively related to firm value. Another possible explanation is that 
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rational risk-averse managers may be too reluctant to take risky but high-expected-return projects. 
If so, managerial overconfidence can be beneficial for stockholders as a means of encouraging 
desirable risk-taking. Indeed, this may help explain the puzzle of why overconfident managers 
are permitted to rise to the CEO position in many firms.20  
 
7  Does Overconfidence Affect Firm Value and Performance? 
Our proposed solution to the overconfident manager puzzle, that overconfident managers 
improve innovation, suggests that overconfident CEOs do not necessarily harm firm value or 
profitability. We therefore examine the effect of overconfidence on future Q, ROA, and 
Log(Sales). We found earlier that overconfidence increases R&D, which is expensed and 
therefore mechanically reduces the book value of assets in the short run. Since Q and ROA 
contain assets in the denominator, it is important to control for lagged R&D in tests with these 
dependent variables. All the independent variables are lagged by one period with respect to the 
dependent variables. The conclusions drawn are similar if we lag the independent variables by 
two or three periods.    
The results are reported in Table 10. For brevity, we show results where we control for 
firm characteristics only. The results are similar if we also include manager-related 
characteristics, such as tenure, share and option ownership, or CEO delta and vega values. 
Overall, we find no evidence that overconfidence reduces Q, ROA, or Log(sales). The evidence 
                                                 
20 It could alternatively be argued that the propensity of overconfident managers to increase risk is desirable for 
shareholders because it helps them expropriate debtholders. However, if potential debtholders foresee this agency 
problem prior to issuance, it is equity rather than debt that bears the cost of inefficient risky projects. Furthermore, 
this argument does not explain why shareholders would hire overconfident managers who make acquisitions that 
reduce equity value, as found by Malmendier and Tate (2008). 
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is not entirely consistent across specifications, but there is some indication that these dependent 
variables are positively related to CEO overconfidence.  
For tests where Log(sales) is the dependent variable, we run regressions with and without 
the ratio of R&D to assets as a control. For both specifications, we find that there is a significant 
positive relation between CEO overconfidence and subsequent Log(sales). Therefore, controlling 
for current sales, overconfident CEOs are associated with higher future sales. However, the 
results are weaker and less consistent if we use Log(assets) as a control instead of Log(sales).  
The tests for ROA and Q (in which we control for R&D) are somewhat more mixed. The 
effect of overconfidence on both ROA and Q is positive and significant using the options-based 
overconfidence measure but not  the press-based overconfidence measure. Overall, it is not clear 
whether overconfidence increases performance, but there is no sign whatsoever that it reduces 
performance. This is consistent with the idea that there are advantages as well as disadvantages 
to CEO overconfidence. 
 
8  Concluding Remarks 
Using proxies for CEO overconfidence based upon options exercise and press coverage, 
we find that over the 1993-2003 period, overconfident CEOs undertake riskier projects, invest 
more heavily in innovation, achieve a greater total quantity of innovation as measured by patent 
applications and patent citations, and are more effective innovators in the sense that they achieve 
greater innovation controlling for the amount of R&D expenditure. Greater innovative output of 
overconfident managers is achieved only in innovative industries. We find no sign that 
overconfident CEOs achieve inferior firm performance as measured by sales, ROA, or Tobin’s Q.  
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Our main findings could derive from overconfidence causing innovation, or from 
innovative firms matching with overconfident CEOs. However, the characteristics of firms 
evolve over time, so we expect recently-appointed CEOs to be best-matched to the 
characteristics of the hiring firms. We find that overconfidence remains a strong and significant 
predictor of innovation even when we remove managers with short tenures at their firms. 
Intuitively, it would be surprising if innovative firms continued to seek overconfident CEOs if 
overconfidence were not useful for business needs.  
The results of this study have a bearing on the usual presumption that overconfidence is 
undesirable. Business commentators often point to examples of headstrong, overconfident CEOs 
who made disastrous decisions. However, the chance of a big defeat may be a corollary to the 
chance of great victory, so the lesson to draw from examples is unclear. A more serious charge is 
provided by the evidence of Malmendier and Tate (2008) that the market reacts more negatively 
to acquisitions made by overconfident CEOs. This dark side to CEO overconfidence might seem 
to suggest that the CEO selection process should be designed to filter out CEOs with oversized 
egos, or that compensation and governance should be designed to constrain such CEOs more 
severely. 
On the other hand, a few authors have suggested positive roles for overconfidence, such 
as improving decision implementation (Russo and Schoemaker 1992), encouraging agents to 
take sufficient risk on behalf of principals (Goel and Thakor 2008, Gervais, Odean, and Heaton 
2009), or countering information externality problems by stimulating entrepreneurship and 
experimentation (Bernardo and Welch 2001). 
Our tests identify empirically a positive side to CEO overconfidence. Within innovative 
industries, greater confidence results in greater innovation, both on the input side (R&D) and on 
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the output side (patents and citations). Furthermore, for a given expenditure on R&D, 
overconfident managers achieve greater innovative success.  
Why would overconfidence adversely affect acquisition decisions, yet favorably affect 
innovation decisions? This may be a natural consequence of the bright sides and the dark sides of 
CEO overconfidence. We have argued, consistent with Goel and Thakor (2008) and Gervais, 
Heaton, and Odean (2009), that if managers are risk averse, the willingness to take audacious 
risks can be valuable to the firm. However, overconfidence may have more adverse effects for 
external acquisition than for internally-driven innovation. Self-aggrandizing CEOs may engage 
in excessive empire-building through acquisition because they overestimate their ability to exert 
effective control over a wider domain.  
Our findings therefore suggest a possible solution to the puzzle of why so many firms 
hire overconfident CEOs and CFOs (Malmendier and Tate 2005a, 2008, Ben-David, Graham and 
Harvey 2007, Graham, Harvey and Puri 2008), and why such CEOs seem to be placed at the 
helm of growth firms (Graham, Harvey and Puri 2008)—exactly the kind of firm in which 
overconfidence will have the greatest effect. The hiring of such managers, and their matching 
with growth firms, may be efficient if overconfident CEOs are better innovators.  
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Appendix A 
This appendix defines the variables used in the study. Accounting data is from Compustat, stock 
return data from CRSP, patent data is from the NBER patent dataset, and compensation data 
from Execucomp. 
 
Variables Description 
  
Dependent variables  
Stock return volatility Standard deviation of daily stock returns over the year, in percentage 
R&D / Assets Research and development expenditures scaled by book assets. Missing values are 
coded with zero 
Patent No. of patents applied for during the year 
Citation (raw) count Total number of citations summed across all patents applied for during the year 
Citation count Total number of citations summed across all patents applied for during the year. 
Each patent's no. of citations is multiplied by the weighting index from Hall, Jaffe, 
and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005) 
  
Variables relating to CEO overconfidence, lagged values 
Confident CEO (Options) Options-based measure of CEO overconfidence. Indicator variable equals to one 
for all years after a CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-money, and 
zero otherwise 
Confident CEO (Press) Press-based measure of CEO overconfidence. Indicator variable equals one when 
the no. of "confident" articles for a CEO in Factiva is greater than the no. of 
"cautious" articles, and zero otherwise 
TotalMention No. of articles mentioning the CEO 
  
Other independent variables, lagged values 
Sales Firm sales in millions of 2006 dollars 
Sales growth Log transformation of sales divided by prior year sales 
ROA Return on assets, ratio of operating income before depreciation to book assets 
Book leverage Ratio of sum of long-term debt and short-term debt to book assets  
PPE / Emp Ratio of net property, plant, and equipment in 2006 dollars to no. of employees 
Cash Ratio of cash to book assets 
CEO tenure  CEO tenure in months 
CEO share ownership (%) % of common stocks held by CEO 
CEO option holdings (%) Total no. of options held by CEO scaled by shares outstanding (%) 
CEO delta Dollar change in CEO stock and option portfolio for 1% change in stock price, in 
thousands of 2006 dollars  
CEO vega Dollar change in CEO option holdings for a 1% change in stock return volatility, 
in thousands of 2006 dollars 
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Table 1. Frequency of overconfident CEOs 
The table gives the yearly breakdown of the number of CEOs, number of overconfident CEOs, and 
percentage of overconfident CEOs in our sample. Sample of CEOs is from Execucomp from 1993 to 
2003. Financial and utility firms are deleted. We require that firms have accounting data from Compustat, 
stock returns data from CRSP, and patent data from the NBER patent dataset. The options-based measure 
of CEO overconfidence defines a CEO as being overconfident after he holds options that are at least 67% 
in-the-money.  The press-based measure of CEO overconfidence defines a CEO as being overconfident 
when the number of ‘confident’ articles for a CEO in Factiva exceeds the number of ‘cautious’ articles. 
For brevity, overconfident CEOs are labeled as ‘confident’ in the tables. 
 
  Options-based measure   Press-based measure 
Year  
No. of 
CEOs 
Confident 
CEOs (#) 
Confident 
CEOs (%)  
No. of 
CEOs 
Confident 
CEOs (#) 
Confident 
CEOs (%) 
1993  533 228 42.78  564 8 1.42 
1994  798 414 51.88  695 22 3.17 
1995  857 440 51.34  720 31 4.31 
1996  915 524 57.27  781 35 4.48 
1997  982 622 63.34  850 59 6.94 
1998  1038 715 68.88  931 58 6.23 
1999  1059 730 68.93  953 84 8.81 
2000  1006 688 68.39  917 97 10.58 
2001  980 660 67.35  894 100 11.19 
2002  1052 663 63.02  968 103 10.64 
2003  1077 633 58.77  973 115 11.82 
Total   10297 6317 61.35   9246 712 7.70 
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Table 2. Summary statistics  
The table gives the means and medians of the variables used in this study. The sample consists of all non-
financial and non-utility firms in Execucomp from 1993 to 2003. To be included in the sample, firms are 
required to have accounting data from Compustat, patent data from the NBER patent dataset, and stock 
returns data from CRSP. Panel A divides the firms based on the options-based measure of CEO 
overconfidence. Panel B divides the firms based on the press-based measure of CEO overconfidence. The 
options-based measure of CEO overconfidence defines a CEO as being overconfident after he holds 
options that are at least 67% in-the-money. The press-based measure of CEO overconfidence defines a 
CEO as being overconfident when the number of ‘confident’ articles for a CEO in Factiva exceeds the 
number of ‘cautious’ articles. For brevity, overconfident CEOs are labeled as ‘confident’ in the tables. 
Definitions of the variables are described in Appendix A. T-tests (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests) are 
conducted to test for differences between the means (medians) for the firms with overconfident CEOs and 
firms with non-overconfident CEOs. *, **, and *** measure significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A. Options-based measure of confidence 
Non-confident CEO      
(N = 3980 )   Confident CEO (N = 6317)   
Variable Mean Median Mean Median 
Dependent variables     
Stock return volatility 2.689 2.294  3.217 *** 2.879 *** 
R&D / Assets 0.028 0.000  0.046 *** 0.008 *** 
No. of patents 21.886 0.000  30.302 *** 0.000  
Citation (raw) count 139.067 0.000  204.110 *** 0.000  
Citation count 290.681 0.000  522.877 *** 0.000 * 
        
Control variables        
Sales 4637.250 1404.500  3592.530 *** 938.469 *** 
Sales growth 0.054 0.048  0.171 *** 0.131 *** 
ROA 0.134 0.136  0.152 *** 0.158 *** 
Book leverage 0.252 0.254  0.208 *** 0.194 *** 
PPE / Emp 181264.780 54129.230  132500.420 *** 43920.010 *** 
Cash 0.096 0.037  0.158 *** 0.072 *** 
CEO tenure  69.435 39.000  104.971 *** 83.000 *** 
CEO share ownership (%) 2.297 0.240  2.961 *** 0.645 *** 
CEO option holdings (%) 1.193 0.751  1.721 *** 1.237 *** 
CEO delta 357.604 127.101  959.904 *** 309.866 *** 
CEO vega 100.264 44.936  122.978 *** 45.572  
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Panel B. Press-based measure of confidence 
Non-confident CEO      
(N = 8534 )   Confident CEO (N = 712)   
Variable Mean Median Mean Median 
Dependent variables     
Stock return volatility 3.048 2.698  3.135  2.735  
R&D / Assets 0.037 0.001  0.044 *** 0.013 *** 
No. of patents 18.926 0.000  77.750 *** 4.000 *** 
Citation (raw) count 137.887 0.000  310.782 *** 4.000 *** 
Citation count    319.422 0.000  956.037 *** 19.571 *** 
        
Control variables        
TotalMention 1.267 0.000  10.208 *** 4.000 *** 
Sales 2927.830 909.288  8834.060 *** 3910.760 *** 
Sales growth 0.133 0.100  0.106 *** 0.073 *** 
ROA 0.149 0.152  0.146  0.144 * 
Book leverage 0.210 0.197  0.242 *** 0.226 *** 
PPE / Emp 128711.110 42917.040  144189.970  58613.660 *** 
Cash 0.143 0.060  0.142  0.066  
CEO tenure  98.832 70.000  99.166  69.000  
CEO share ownership (%) 3.892 0.600  4.128  0.271 *** 
CEO option holdings (%) 1.389 0.929  1.122 *** 0.692 *** 
CEO delta 755.166 217.181  2440.300 *** 527.040 *** 
CEO vega 84.781 34.170  251.902 *** 119.346 *** 
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Table 3. Overconfident CEOs and stock return volatility 
The table presents results of regressions of stock return volatility on CEO overconfidence. Stock return 
volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the fiscal year, in percentage. Confident 
CEO (Options) is an indicator variable equals to one for all years after the CEO holds options that are at 
least 67% in-the-money. Confident CEO (Press) is an indicator variable equals to one when the number of 
‘confident’ articles for a CEO in Factiva exceeds the number of ‘cautious’ articles. All independent 
variables are lagged by one year. Definitions of the variables are described in Appendix A. All 
regressions include year and industry fixed effects, defined based on 2-digit SIC codes. Intercepts are not 
reported. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** measure 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable = Stock return volatility 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Confident CEO (Options) 0.104*** 0.107*** 0.098***    
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.037)    
Confident CEO (Press)    0.201*** 0.226*** 0.228*** 
    (0.065) (0.069) (0.069) 
TotalMention    0.004 0.003 0.004 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Log(sales) -0.232*** -0.213*** -0.198*** -0.275*** -0.257*** -0.257***
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) 
Sales growth 0.527*** 0.497*** 0.497*** 0.665*** 0.638*** 0.633*** 
 (0.061) (0.063) (0.061) (0.068) (0.074) (0.075) 
ROA -3.472*** -3.511*** -3.554*** -3.473*** -3.529*** -3.568***
 (0.195) (0.204) (0.203) (0.207) (0.224) (0.224) 
Book leverage 0.250** 0.184 0.199 0.292** 0.236* 0.262* 
 (0.125) (0.131) (0.130) (0.130) (0.140) (0.141) 
Log(PPE / Emp) 0.000 0.009 0.010 0.024 0.036 0.034 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) 
Cash 1.502*** 1.525*** 1.590*** 1.166*** 1.187*** 1.196*** 
 (0.141) (0.141) (0.142) (0.162) (0.174) (0.177) 
Log(1+tenure)  -0.030* -0.021  -0.037* -0.036* 
  (0.018) (0.019)  (0.019) (0.021) 
Share ownership (%)  0.005   0.000  
  (0.003)   (0.003)  
Option holdings (%)  0.025**   0.034***  
  (0.011)   (0.013)  
Log(1+delta)   0.019   0.003 
   (0.017)   (0.018) 
Log(1+vega)   -0.062***   -0.027* 
   (0.017)   (0.016) 
No. of firm-years 10297 9180 9131 9246 8034 7985 
No. of firms 1826 1728 1727 1378 1306 1305 
Adj R-square 0.541 0.546 0.548 0.533 0.532 0.533 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 4. Overconfident CEOs and R&D expenditures 
The table presents results of regressions of research and development expenditures (R&D) on CEO 
overconfidence. The dependent variable is the ratio of R&D to book assets. Missing values of R&D are 
coded with zero. Confident CEO (Options) is an indicator variable equals to one for all years after the 
CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-money. Confident CEO (Press) is an indicator variable 
equals to one when the number of ‘confident’ articles for a CEO in Factiva exceeds the number of 
‘cautious’ articles. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Definitions of the variables are 
described in Appendix A. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects, defined based on 2-digit 
SIC codes. Intercepts are not reported. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** measure significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable = R&D / Assets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Confident CEO (Options) 0.006** 0.005** 0.008***    
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Confident CEO (Press)    0.009** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
TotalMention    0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(sales) -0.002** -0.003** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Sales growth 0.000 0.004 0.005 -0.005 0.001 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
ROA -0.182*** -0.176*** -0.174*** -0.173*** -0.165*** -0.168*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) 
Book leverage -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.032*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log(PPE / Emp) 0.003** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash 0.146*** 0.141*** 0.136*** 0.124*** 0.118*** 0.114*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Log(1+tenure)  -0.001 -0.002  0.000 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Share ownership (%)  -0.001***   -0.001***  
  (0.000)   (0.000)  
Option holdings (%)  0.000   0.001  
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
Log(1+delta)   -0.003***   -0.002* 
   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Log(1+vega)   0.007***   0.005*** 
   (0.001)   (0.001) 
No. of firm-years 10297 9180 9131 9246 8034 7985 
No. of firms 1826 1728 1727 1378 1306 1305 
Adj R-square 0.430 0.449 0.453 0.409 0.438 0.439 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 5. Overconfident CEOs and patent counts 
The table presents results of regressions of patent counts on CEO overconfidence. Patent is the number of 
patents applied for during the year. Confident CEO (Options) is an indicator variable equals to one for all 
years after the CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-money. Confident CEO (Press) is an 
indicator variable equals to one when the number of ‘confident’ articles for a CEO in Factiva exceeds the 
number of ‘cautious’ articles. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Definitions of the 
variables are described in Appendix A. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects, defined 
based on 2-digit SIC codes. Intercepts are not reported. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** measure significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. + 
indicates p-value of 10.1%. 
 
Dependent variable = Log (1 + patent) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Confident CEO (Options) 0.111** 0.111** 0.086+    
 (0.046) (0.050) (0.052)    
Confident CEO (Press)    0.275*** 0.291*** 0.271** 
    (0.106) (0.110) (0.110) 
TotalMention    0.026*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 
    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Log(sales) 0.446*** 0.431*** 0.368*** 0.367*** 0.349*** 0.326*** 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) 
Log(PPE / Emp) 0.192*** 0.202*** 0.176*** 0.213*** 0.216*** 0.203*** 
 (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.048) (0.049) 
Log(1+tenure)  -0.015 -0.059**  0.002 -0.030 
  (0.025) (0.025)  (0.025) (0.025) 
Share ownership (%)  -0.010**   -0.013***  
  (0.004)   (0.004)  
Option holdings (%)  -0.014   -0.014  
  (0.013)   (0.014)  
Log(1+delta)   0.034   0.011 
   (0.025)   (0.021) 
Log(1+vega)   0.132***   0.083*** 
   (0.027)   (0.022) 
No. of firm-years 10297 9180 9131 9246 8034 7985 
No. of firms 1826 1728 1727 1378 1306 1305 
Adj R-square 0.480 0.493 0.501 0.512 0.530 0.532 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 6. Overconfident CEOs and patent citations 
The table presents results of regressions of patent citations on CEO overconfidence. Citation count is the 
total number of citations to all the patents applied for during the year. To take into account truncation bias, 
the raw citation count number for each patent is multiplied with the weighting index from Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg (2001, 2005). Then the adjusted citation count of each patent belonging to a firm-year is 
aggregated up to the firm-year level. Confident CEO (Options) is an indicator variable equals to one for 
all years after the CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-money. Confident CEO (Press) is an 
indicator variable equals to one when the number of ‘confident’ articles for a CEO in Factiva exceeds the 
number of ‘cautious’ articles. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Definitions of the 
variables are described in Appendix A. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects, defined 
based on 2-digit SIC codes. Intercepts are not reported. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** measure significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable =  Log (1 + citation count) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Confident CEO (Options) 0.201*** 0.188** 0.156*    
 (0.075) (0.080) (0.085)    
Confident CEO (Press)    0.388** 0.436*** 0.405** 
    (0.159) (0.161) (0.161) 
TotalMention    0.034*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Log(sales) 0.601*** 0.572*** 0.469*** 0.496*** 0.461*** 0.425*** 
 (0.038) (0.041) (0.045) (0.042) (0.046) (0.047) 
Log(PPE / Emp) 0.294*** 0.317*** 0.275*** 0.317*** 0.335*** 0.313*** 
 (0.064) (0.066) (0.066) (0.072) (0.077) (0.079) 
Log(1+tenure)  -0.015 -0.084**  0.013 -0.044 
  (0.040) (0.041)  (0.040) (0.042) 
Share ownership (%)  -0.019***   -0.022***  
  (0.007)   (0.007)  
Option holdings (%)  -0.014   -0.015  
  (0.023)   (0.024)  
Log(1+delta)   0.044   0.024 
   (0.041)   (0.035) 
Log(1+vega)   0.221***   0.130*** 
   (0.045)   (0.036) 
No. of firm-years 10297 9180 9131 9246 8034 7985 
No. of firms 1826 1728 1727 1378 1306 1305 
Adj R-square 0.457 0.470 0.478 0.484 0.502 0.504 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 7. Effect of industry innovativeness 
The table presents results from regressions of patent citations on CEO overconfidence, where firms are classified based on whether they belong to 
an innovative industry or not. An innovative industry is one where the average citation (adjusted for truncation bias) per patent for the industry is 
greater than the median average citation across all industries. Innovative industry is lagged by one year. Citation count is the total number of 
citations to all the patents applied for during the year. To take into account truncation bias, the raw citation count number for each patent is 
multiplied with the weighting index from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005). Then the adjusted citation count of each patent belonging to a 
firm-year is aggregated up to the firm-year level. Confident CEO (Options) is an indicator variable equals to one for all years after the CEO holds 
options that are at least 67% in-the-money. Confident CEO (Press) is an indicator variable equals to one when the number of ‘confident’ articles 
for a CEO in Factiva exceeds the number of ‘cautious’ articles. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Definitions of the variables are 
described in Appendix A. All regressions include year and industry fixed effects, defined based on 2-digit SIC codes. Intercepts are not reported. 
Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** measure significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Dependent variable =  Log (1 + citation count) 
 Innovative industry Non-innovative industry 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Confident CEO (Options) 0.279*** 0.281*** 0.260**    0.019 -0.006 -0.039    
 (0.089) (0.097) (0.104)    (0.113) (0.119) (0.123)    
Confident CEO (Press)    0.549*** 0.613*** 0.592***    -0.046 -0.021 -0.053 
    (0.199) (0.200) (0.199)    (0.211) (0.226) (0.223) 
TotalMention    0.029*** 0.030*** 0.025***    0.050*** 0.047*** 0.045***
    (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)    (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Log(sales) 0.667*** 0.628*** 0.502*** 0.548*** 0.502*** 0.452*** 0.472*** 0.467*** 0.406*** 0.394*** 0.383*** 0.375***
 (0.046) (0.049) (0.054) (0.050) (0.056) (0.058) (0.053) (0.055) (0.062) (0.057) (0.060) (0.063) 
Log(PPE / Emp) 0.361*** 0.385*** 0.319*** 0.388*** 0.412*** 0.372*** 0.133* 0.162** 0.154* 0.153* 0.155* 0.156* 
 (0.082) (0.085) (0.086) (0.094) (0.103) (0.105) (0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.078) (0.082) (0.083) 
Log(1+tenure)  -0.034 -0.123**  -0.006 -0.083  0.002 -0.037  0.024 0.001 
  (0.049) (0.049)  (0.051) (0.052)  (0.061) (0.063)  (0.055) (0.058) 
Share ownership (%)  -0.022**   -0.027***  -0.014*   -0.012*  
  (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.008)   (0.007)  
Option holdings (%)  -0.015   -0.010   -0.004   -0.026  
  (0.029)   (0.032)   (0.025)   (0.027)  
Log(1+delta)   0.064   0.044   0.015   -0.006 
   (0.051)   (0.044)   (0.058)   (0.045) 
Log(1+vega)   0.258***   0.152***   0.140**   0.074* 
   (0.054)   (0.044)   (0.064)   (0.044) 
No. of firm-years 7010 6228 6191 6210 5363 5327 3287 2952 2940 3036 2671 2658 
No. of firms 1616 1511 1507 1233 1159 1156 813 760 759 663 611 611 
Adj R-square 0.455 0.467 0.476 0.472 0.495 0.497 0.411 0.429 0.434 0.446 0.468 0.470 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8. Deleting firms with short-tenured CEOs 
The sample consists of all firms where the CEO has tenure of more than 60 months. The table shows the results from regressions of various 
dependent variables on measures of CEO overconfidence and other control variables. Only the coefficients and standard errors associated with the 
confidence variables are shown. The control variables and model specifications for regressions involving stock return volatility and research and 
development expenditures scaled by assets are similar to the ones used in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. The control variables and model 
specifications involving patent count and citation count are similar to the ones used in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. Confident CEO (Options) is an 
indicator variable equals to one for all years after the CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-money. Confident CEO (Press) is an indicator 
variable equals to one when the number of ‘confident’ articles for a CEO in Factiva exceeds the number of ‘cautious’ articles. All regressions 
include year and industry fixed effects, defined based on 2-digit SIC codes. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** measure significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Panel A: Dependent variable = Stock return volatility 
Confident CEO (Options) 0.106** 0.125** 0.105**    
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.053)    
Confident CEO (Press)    0.201** 0.207** 0.208** 
    (0.085) (0.087) (0.087) 
       
Panel B: Dependent variable = R&D / Assets 
Confident CEO (Options) 0.009*** 0.008** 0.010***    
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Confident CEO (Press)    0.013** 0.014** 0.013** 
    (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
       
Panel C: Dependent variable =Log (1+ patent) 
Confident CEO (Options) 0.158** 0.145** 0.142**    
 (0.069) (0.067) (0.070)    
Confident CEO (Press)    0.386*** 0.373*** 0.340** 
    (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) 
       
Panel D: Dependent variable = Log (1 + citation count) 
Confident CEO (Options) 0.249** 0.213* 0.219*    
 (0.114) (0.112) (0.118)    
Confident CEO (Press)    0.546** 0.527** 0.483** 
    (0.212) (0.209) (0.210) 
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Table 9. Effectiveness of Innovative Activity 
The table presents results from regressions that test the effect of overconfident CEOs on the effectiveness of innovation for given research and 
development (R&D) expenditure. Firms are classified based on whether they belong to an innovative industry or not. An innovative industry is one 
where the average citation (adjusted for truncation bias) per patent for the industry is greater than the median average citation across all industries. 
Innovative industry is lagged by one year. Citation count is the total number of citations to all the patents applied for during the year. To take into 
account truncation bias, the raw citation count number for each patent is multiplied with the weighting index from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 
(2001, 2005). Then the adjusted citation count of each patent belonging to a firm-year is aggregated up to the firm-year level. Confident CEO 
(Options) is an indicator variable equals to one for all years after the CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-money. Confident CEO (Press) 
is an indicator variable equals to one when the number of ‘confident’ articles for a CEO in Factiva exceeds the number of ‘cautious’ articles. All 
independent variables are lagged by one year. Definitions of the variables are described in Appendix A. All regressions include year and industry 
fixed effects, defined based on 2-digit SIC codes. Intercepts are not reported. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** measure significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Dependent variable =  Log (1 + citation count) 
 Innovative industry  Non-innovative industry 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Confident CEO (Options) 0.254*** 0.242*** 0.204**     -0.073 -0.097 -0.120    
 (0.083) (0.091) (0.098)     (0.107) (0.114) (0.121)    
Confident CEO (Press)    0.358** 0.382** 0.371**     -0.081 -0.041 -0.063 
    (0.173) (0.176) (0.176)     (0.217) (0.234) (0.230) 
TotalMention    0.020*** 0.021*** 0.017**     0.035*** 0.035*** 0.034***
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)     (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log(sales) 0.775*** 0.735*** 0.645*** 0.688*** 0.641*** 0.608***  0.602*** 0.594*** 0.569*** 0.534*** 0.510*** 0.523***
 (0.045) (0.048) (0.054) (0.049) (0.056) (0.057)  (0.051) (0.054) (0.061) (0.054) (0.058) (0.059) 
Log(PPE / Emp) 0.277*** 0.297*** 0.256*** 0.286*** 0.318*** 0.292***  0.159** 0.191** 0.186** 0.162** 0.168** 0.169** 
 (0.075) (0.078) (0.079) (0.085) (0.095) (0.096)  (0.077) (0.079) (0.079) (0.076) (0.082) (0.082) 
R&D/Assets 12.907*** 12.998*** 12.459*** 12.812*** 12.230*** 12.105***  8.850*** 8.191*** 7.991*** 8.526*** 7.536*** 7.463***
 (1.003) (1.022) (1.008) (1.087) (1.142) (1.131)  (1.402) (1.396) (1.402) (1.671) (1.738) (1.733) 
Log(1+tenure)  -0.027 -0.095**  0.008 -0.056   0.015 -0.007  0.020 0.011 
  (0.046) (0.046)  (0.048) (0.049)   (0.059) (0.060)  (0.053) (0.056) 
Share ownership (%)  -0.010   -0.015*    -0.005   -0.006  
  (0.009)   (0.008)    (0.007)   (0.006)  
Option holdings (%)  -0.029   -0.025    -0.015   -0.042  
  (0.027)   (0.031)    (0.024)   (0.027)  
Log(1+delta)   0.077   0.062    0.014   -0.018 
   (0.047)   (0.042)    (0.056)   (0.043) 
Log(1+vega)   0.162***   0.086**    0.057   0.033 
   (0.051)   (0.041)    (0.064)   (0.042) 
No. of firm-years 7010 6228 6191 6210 5363 5327  3287 2952 2940 3036 2671 2658 
No. of firms 1616 1511 1507 1233 1159 1156  813 760 759 663 611 611 
Adj R-square 0.506 0.518 0.522 0.525 0.541 0.542  0.446 0.458 0.461 0.475 0.489 0.490 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 10. Overconfident CEOs and Performance 
The table presents results from regressions that test the effect of CEO overconfidence on firm 
performance as measured by sales, Tobin’s Q, and return on assets (ROA). All the independent variables 
are lagged one period with respect to the timing of the dependent variables. Sales is measured in 2006 
million dollars. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets, where the market 
value of assets is equals to the sum of book value of assets and market value of equity less the sum of 
book value of equity and deferred taxes. ROA is defined as the ratio of operating income before 
depreciation to book value of assets. Confident CEO (Options) is an indicator variable equals to one for 
all years after the CEO holds options that are at least 67% in-the-money. Confident CEO (Press) is an 
indicator variable equals to one when the number of ‘confident’ articles for a CEO in Factiva exceeds the 
number of ‘cautious’ articles. Definitions of the other variables are described in Appendix A. All 
regressions include year and industry fixed effects, defined based on 2-digit SIC codes. Intercepts are not 
reported. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** measure 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable =  
 Log(sales) Log(sales) Tobin's Q ROA 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Confident CEO (Options) 0.076***  0.076***  0.483***  0.017***  
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.042)  (0.003)  
Confident CEO (Press)  0.029**  0.032***  0.128  -0.001 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.130)  (0.006) 
TotalMention  0.002***  0.003***  0.034***  0.001*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.000) 
Log(sales) 0.965*** 0.956*** 0.964*** 0.953*** -0.062*** -0.167***   
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.023) (0.028)   
Log(PPE / Emp) 0.007 0.004 0.007* 0.005 -0.004 -0.013 0.005** 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.033) (0.035) (0.002) (0.003) 
R&D/Assets   -0.080 -0.215*** 8.022*** 6.788*** -0.575*** -0.587*** 
   (0.071) (0.081) (0.814) (0.885) (0.063) (0.073) 
No. of firm-years 10295 9244 10295 9244 10291 9241 10293 9242 
No. of firms 1826 1378 1826 1378 1826 1378 1826 1378 
Adj R-square 0.978 0.975 0.978 0.975 0.232 0.216 0.172 0.176 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
  
 
